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How Criminal Organisations Exert Secret Power over Communities: An 
Intracultural Appropriation Theory of Cultural Values and Norms 
  Abstract 
A key feature of criminal organisations is their ability to exert secret power - 
governance over the community and inhibition of overt public opposition (omertà). 
Traditional theory has attributed omertà to fear or passivity. Here, an alternative 
model grounded in different premises, Intracultural Appropriation Theory (ICAT), 
stresses the central role of cultural factors in sustaining relations of domination 
between groups in society. Specifically, ICAT contends that non-state agents achieve 
legitimacy and influence among people by claiming to embody cultural values shared 
within the community. In the case of Italian organised crime, criminal organisations’ 
strategic adherence to values of masculinity and honour bestows legitimacy on their 
actions, enabling them to exert and sustain secret power. We report empirical 
evidence in support of this proposition, and derive a new formulation of omertà which 
focuses on social emotions, social identity and the role of social change beliefs. We 
suggest that the theory contributes to a new perspective for the analysis of cultural 
values, political action, and cultural honour, and that it should generalise to account 





omertà, power, criminal organisations, honour values, collective action, intracultural 
appropriation theory, culture, ideology  




The term ‘criminal organisation’ is used to refer to a broad range of groups 
that pursue illegal activities in a systematic, organised way. Generally, criminal 
organisations provide people with goods and services whose production or sale is 
criminalised or, in some way, limited by the laws of the state. The pursuit of profit is, 
therefore, an obvious goal of these groups. However, their activities extend well 
beyond the accumulation of money and illicit gains (Paoli, 2003). Indeed, a distinctive 
feature of these organisations is their ability to exert political power over other 
criminals (Toros & Mavelli, 2013; von Lampe, 2016). For instance, within their 
territories, they exert control over other criminals’ illegal activities such as by 
requiring them to ask for permission, or pay a fee, before engaging in crimes. They 
may even be powerful enough to designate some targets or activities as off limits to 
other criminals.  
Secret Power  
In the present article, we highlight a third, and in our view potentially even 
more important feature of criminal organisations: their ability to exert social, 
economic and political power over vast segments of the population of law-abiding 
citizens (Marshall, 2013). We refer to this general capacity as ‘secret power’. Such 
power is not formally recognized or delimited by statutory authorities yet it is 
constituted and regulated through clearly structured social properties such as group 
memberships, social or geographical reach, systems of exchange and responsibility, 
forms of constraint, and culturally rooted rules, often backed by tradition and 
precedent. A key issue for social psychology is to understand the values and beliefs 
that enable agents like criminal organisations to achieve the legitimacy necessary to 
engage in this form of (extra-legal) governance.  




We contend that analysis of the role of such values and beliefs in the context 
of criminal organisations is useful because it may help shed light on the psychological 
basis of secret power across multiple contexts and groups. Research in psychology 
has examined the processes underpinning individuals’ legitimisation of social and 
political institutions (e.g., Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013; Jost, 2018; 
Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Tyler, 2006). However, this research has mostly 
focused, implicitly or explicitly, on systems of governance rooted in the legal 
authority of the state (Tyler, 2006). However, the state and its institutions are not the 
only (or sometimes even the main) legitimate authorities in many societies (Strange, 
1996). A number of other social agents can influence local communities and civil 
society. These agents can be outlaw or subversive organisations such as terrorists, 
bandits, street gangs, mafias, paramilitary groups and revolutionaries. They can also 
be large corporations and transnational NGOs, or religious institutions that transcend 
or behave orthogonally to the jurisdiction of a single state (Strange, 1996). These 
agents are often unable or unwilling to rely on legal procedures and rules to sustain 
their legitimacy (cf. Weber, 1978). The question is, what are the bases of their secret 
power? 
To examine this question, in this article we focus on a prototypical – but by no 
means unique – example of extra-legal governance, that of Italian organised crime. 
Italian criminal organisations originated and sustain power in southern Italian regions 
but operate on a transnational scale. In their Southern Italian heartlands, they have 
infiltrated numerous aspects of public and political life and play an important role in 
regulating local economic activities, imposing norms, and even administering justice 
(Allum, 2006; Paoli, 2003; Ruggiero, 1997; Schneider & Schneider, 2003; Skaperdas 
& Syropoulous, 1995). Their presence in Southern Italy is associated with increased 




violence, substantial economic losses and reduced confidence in public life (Daniele 
& Marani, 2011; Lavezzi, 2014; Pinotti, 2012; Schneider, 2018; Sciarrone & Storti, 
2014). Yet, despite suffering significantly from the predatory presence of criminal 
organisations, local communities rarely question, challenge or oppose them, a 
phenomenon known as omertà.  
To understand the psychology of omertà, we propose a new theoretical 
framework, Intracultural Appropriation Theory (ICAT). ICAT highlights the 
importance of context-dependent and group-specific cultural values in sustaining 
relationships of domination among groups in society. According to ICAT, non-state 
agents such as criminal organisations cannot establish their authority within a legal 
framework of official rules and institutions (Tyler, 2006; cf. Weber, 1978). Their 
legitimacy, instead, depends on their ability to embody cultural values and traditions 
shared within the community. 
From this theoretical framework, we derive a new model to explain the social 
and cultural psychological underpinnings of omertà and we systematically review and 
analyse available evidence in support of this model, using Italian criminal 
organisations as a prototypical case study. Our central contention is that the readily 
available and dominant cultural values of masculine honour provide a normative basis 
for, and bestow legitimacy on, criminal organisations dominant position in society. 
After considering empirical evidence and building the case for ICAT, we broaden our 
discussion to other contexts and theories, and consider the generalisability of our 
findings.  
Thus, the first half of this paper provides an integrative review of the extant 
literature, whilst in the second part we present the empirical evidence underpinning 
the development of our theoretical position. More specifically, the first section sets 




out our new theoretical framework, Intracultural Appropriation Theory (ICAT). In the 
second section we derive a model of omertà in the context of previous sociological 
and anthropological work on Italian organised crime, and building also on 
psychological theories of honour, collective action and social identity. ICAT and the 
model both provide a set of organising hypotheses and parameters for understanding 
recent evidence about the conditions in which individuals are less likely to oppose, 
and in fact are more likely to legitimise, organised crime groups, thereby sustaining 
their secret power. In the third section, we consider the generalisability of the model 
to other geographical areas. We also discuss implications for the understanding of the 
relationship between communities and other types of criminal and illegal groups, and 
we suggest central questions for future research.  
Culture as Ideology: Towards a Theory of Intracultural Appropriation 
 What enables subversive, illegal or extra-legal agents to express governance 
over the community? No system of governance can rely exclusively on ‘raw’ 
coercion. Rather, it needs the legitimisation of those who are governed in order to 
operate effectively and over a sustained length of time (Tyler, 2006).  
Turner (2005, p. 12) defines coercion as “the attempt to control a target 
against their will and self-interest through the deployment of human and material 
resources”. Coercion is a dramatic but ineffective form of power because it is 
inherently conflictual and makes targets acutely aware that their freedom is being 
curtailed. Thus, coercion fuels resistance and rejection of the coercive agent. Distinct 
from coercion, authority is the ability to control people “because they are persuaded it 
is right for a certain person [or group] to control them in certain matters” (Turner, 
2005, p. 11). Authority is a much more effective form of power because it is based on 




the claim that the authority’s dictates are ‘proper’ and ‘ought to’ be followed 
(Zelditch, 2001).  
Rule creation and bureaucratic rationalisation are the sources of legitimacy of 
what the sociologist Weber (1978) defined as ‘legal authority’. Relatedly, research in 
psychology indicates that legitimate authority is conferred to an agent to the extent 
that they are perceived as adopting fair procedures to exercise their authority (e.g., 
Tyler, 2000; see Tyler, 2006, for a review). For example, leaders in organisations are 
seen as more legitimate if they adopt fairer procedures for decision-making (e.g., 
Tyler & Blader, 2000). Confidence in the capacity of authorities to engage in 
impartial governance can mitigate the negative impact of poor economic performance 
on electoral support (Magalhaes & Aguiar-Conraria, 2018). However, the legitimacy 
of illegal, extra-legal or subversive groups cannot – by definition – be based on legal 
rules and fair procedures. Other sources must, therefore, underwrite these agent’s 
secret power. 
The Legitimisation of Unequal Social Arrangements in Society 
Inequality is a widespread feature of societies and cultures. Relationships 
based on unequal distribution of resources among groups and individuals are one of 
the four elementary forms of sociality, according to Fiske (1992)’s Relational Model 
Theory. The perpetuation of inequality in social arrangements depends on the 
acquiescence of and tacit legitimisation by those who are part of these arrangements 
(Costa-Lopes et al., 2013). A vast body of research in psychology has examined the 
psychological underpinning of individuals’ willingness to legitimise unequal 
arrangements in society. 
At the group level, Social Dominance Theory contends that hierarchical 
relationships among groups are sustained by institutional discriminatory practices. 




Such practices are made possible by so-called ‘legitimising myths’ or ‘ideologies’ 
(Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004; Sidanius, Cotterill, 
Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Carvacho, 2017). For example, widespread 
endorsement of the meritocratic ideology means that individuals tend to attribute 
structural inequalities among groups to alleged lack of personal capacity among 
lower-ranked individuals. Social dominance theory posits that individuals vary in the 
extent to which they accept or reject legitimising ideologies (i.e., social dominance 
orientation; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
At the societal level, System Justification Theory posits that individuals have a 
basic psychological motivation to justify the status quo and its social and political 
institutions (Jost, 2018; Jost & Banaji, 1994). Justifying the system enables 
individuals to satisfy epistemic, relational and existential needs (Hennes, Nam, Stern, 
& Jost, 2012; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2007). Importantly, research conducted in 
system justification theory shows that when individuals feel dependent on, or 
powerless vis-à-vis, an agent (e.g., the police force, the government) they also 
perceive that agent as more legitimate in the exercise of its authority (van der Toorn, 
et al., 2015; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2010).  
Taken together, these theoretical frameworks support the idea that, under 
some circumstances, members of subordinate groups may accept the legitimacy of 
unequal social arrangements and the institutional authorities overseeing or promoting 
them. Nonetheless, an issue not addressed by these theories is that, in many societies, 
individuals often have to deal with complex nets of power relations that include 
competing agents who make opposing claims to legitimate authority. Even more 
importantly, these agents may be (or at least may appear to be) a threat to the status 




quo and may call the state’s political monopoly and authority into question, rather 
than sustaining it (Stranges, 1996).  
There are many examples of non-state agents playing a key political role 
within the community. Terrorist networks and violent organisations may offer welfare 
services to communities and other social services, undermining state legitimacy and 
gaining wider acceptance (Grynkewich, 2008). For instance, the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland challenged the rule of law, while policing local 
communities (Burton, 1978). Criminal organisations in southern Italy may substitute 
local governments while being supported by local populations (Travaglino, Abrams, 
& Randsley de Moura, 2014). Some communities in the US may express more 
sympathy for gangs than for the police (Akerlof & Yellen, 1994), and hacker groups 
on the internet may receive more support than state authorities (cf. Travaglino, 2017). 
In these circumstances, individuals must choose whom to pledge their allegiance to, 
whom to obey, and which of the competing systems of authority should be sustained 
and regarded as legitimate.  
Intracultural appropriation theory. ICAT proposes that cultural values and 
beliefs play a pivotal role in granting legitimacy to non-state agents, enabling them to 
embed themselves in society and exert influence over the community via secret 
power. The legitimisation process posited by ICAT maps onto another basis of 
legitimacy conceptualised by Weber (1978) as ‘traditional authority’. Specifically, 
ICAT proposes that non-state agents strategically exploit existing cultural values 
shared within the population (hence ‘intra’ cultural appropriation) to gain consensus 
and sustain their power (cf. Schneider & Schneider, 2003). ‘Strategic exploitation’ 
means that such agents appropriate these values while also engaging in the production 
of symbols, employing communicative practices, and social action to reinforce the 




importance and centrality of the values in society. ICAT’s constitutive propositions 
are schematically illustrated in Figure 1.   
According to ICAT, cultural values may become an ideological device that 
establishes and sustains relations of domination in society (cf. Thompson, 1990, pp. 
60-62; see also Geertz, 1964). They do so by providing meaning and legitimacy to the 
actions of a dominant group, demonstrating that they are appropriate and proper in 
relation to shared values and standards, and by grounding the dominant group’s 
activities in shared traditions and identities (Poppi, Travaglino, & Di Piazza, 2018; 
Thompson, 1990; Travaglino, 2017).  
In psychology, studies of cultural values and of ideology have hitherto had 
little cross-fertilisation (see Wolf, 1999, for a discussion in anthropology). On the one 
hand, the study of ideology, defined broadly as ‘systems of shared beliefs’, is in 
practice often narrowed down to that of ‘political attitudes’, whether using a single 
‘left-right’ dimension or more complex multidimensional models (see Jost, Federico, 
& Napier, 2009, for a review). The ideological function of other systems of shared 
values and beliefs, including cultural values, that do not reside in the institutionalised 
power of the state is largely unexplored (for exceptions, see Heidt, Graham, & Joseph, 
2009; Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Bargh, 2009).  
On the other hand, cultural values are rarely examined in relation to the power 
dimension (i.e., inequality) of intergroup relations in society. Culture can be defined 
as a system of shared values, beliefs, and practices that influence how individuals 
perceive their environment (Triandis, 2001). According to Hofstede, Hofstede, and 
Minkov’s (2010) metaphor, culture is the software of the mind because it provides 
individuals with a shared script for thinking, feeling and acting. Culture emerges from 
the institutional, symbolic and collective arrangements of a society (e.g., Kitayama, 




2002). It is, therefore, as much inside the individual’s mind (i.e., the differences in the 
extent to which individuals endorse shared cultural values), as outside the mind, 
embodied in institutions, practices and artefacts (Kitayama, 2002; Leung & Cohen, 
2011; Moon, Travaglino & Uskul, 2018; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).  
It may be in the interest of those who shape such institutions and practices to 
make them appear to be ‘the nature of things’ (Wolf, 2001, p. 398), eternal and 
natural social arrangements that exclude other forms of social order. They are, in fact, 
human-made. Dominant agents have better access to the resources and other 
economic means needed to shape institutions and practices. Thus, such agents are also 
able to impose their own cultural meanings over other (subordinate) groups (Wolf, 
1999). The software of the mind – to stay with Hofstede et al.’s (2010) metaphor – 
does have a programmer. 
In line with this idea, Miyamoto et al. (2018) recently examined the interplay 
between culture, socioeconomic status (SES) and self- (vs. other-) orientation, across 
societies. Using representative samples from both eastern and western contexts, they 
found that SES was positively associated with stronger self-orientation both in 
cultures that promoted an independent self-concept, and in those that promoted an 
interdependent self-concept. However, in cultures promoting an interdependent self-
concept, higher SES was also associated with a stronger other-orientation.  
 In other words, higher status individuals not only enjoy fewer social 
constraints as a result of having more resources (i.e., higher self-orientation). They 
also engage in, and show attributes in line with, their context’s dominant cultural 
practices. Miyamoto et al. (2018) used this evidence to propose a mutually 
constitutive process between culture and SES. Specifically, individuals in dominant 
positions find it easier to pursue their goals while also engaging in culturally 




sanctioned activities. Their ability to mirror shared cultural values legitimises their 
position and higher status. Simultaneously, through their higher status, they reinforce 
the desirability of those cultural values. This process is in line with ICAT’s idea of 
strategic exploitation employed by non-state agents to gain legitimacy and exert 
governance (Travaglino, 2017; Travaglino et al., 2017). 
 ICAT contends that to the extent that individuals endorse a specific set of 
cultural values, they are more likely to sustain and legitimise groups that present 
themselves as the embodiment of such values. We define this process as ‘social 
embedding’. For instance, Travaglino (2017) demonstrated that individuals who 
endorse values of horizontal individualism (a cultural orientation emphasising both 
the autonomy of the self and social equality; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) were more 
likely to support and legitimise the actions of the groups of hackers ‘Anonymous’. 
This is because Anonymous presents itself as the embodiment of values of 
individualism and equality, mirroring the values of horizontal individualism. By 
appropriating such values, it is able to exert influence over the (e-)community and 
acquire legitimacy and influence. At the same time, through its actions, it is also in 
position to highlight the importance of these values.  
Moreover, consonant with the process of social embedding, individuals are 
more likely to support leaders and authority figures who are able to match cultural 
values shared within a given context (Chen, Jing, Lee, & Bai, 2016), and to embody 
and propagate identities and values shared within a group (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 
2011; Hogg, 2001; Steffens, et al., 2014). For instance, in highly hierarchical and 
paternalistic contexts, leaders who are able to embody paternalistic ideals elicit 
positive responses from subordinates, especially when those subordinates endorse 
cultural values promoting the acceptance of such hierarchies (Cheng, Chou, Wu, 




Huang, & Farh, 2004). In addition, research shows that leaders use rhetoric and social 
discourse to present themselves as the embodiment of values and beliefs shared by the 
group, and to indicate future courses of actions that are consonant with ‘who we are’ 
(e.g., Haslam, et al., 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). This ability to embody shared 
values may even contribute to the process of giving authorities licence to act in 
illegal, illicit or otherwise deviant ways (Abrams, Randsley de Moura & Travaglino, 
2013; Abrams, Travaglino, Marques, Pinto, & Levine, 2018; Travaglino, Abrams, 
Randsley de Moura, & Yetkili, 2015).  
In the next section, we apply this novel theoretical framework to the context of 
criminal organisations. Specifically, we use ICAT to derive a model explaining 
individuals’ acceptance and legitimisation of criminal organisations (omertà). We 
thus provide an example of ICAT’s explanatory and heuristic reach in accounting for 
the presence of secret power in a context of high social relevance. 
Criminal Organisations in the Italian context: Governance and Power 
  At present there is no single consensual social scientific definition of criminal 
organisations (cf. Finckenauer, 2005). Social scientific portrayals are often burdened 
by the weight of myths and misconceptions. In addition, the different definitions are 
often shaped by legal and political necessities (Varese, 2010; von Lampe, 2001; 
Wheatley, 2011). According to Paoli (2003), two different paradigms have been used 
to define Italian criminal organisations. Early sociologists (e.g., Hess, 1973) regarded 
them as originating from the ‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviours’ embedded in the cultural 
fabric of some southern Italian regions. According to this ‘characterological 
perspective’, there existed no formal mafia groups, but only individuals who behaved 
as mafiosi1 (Blok, 1988), namely those who exercised power outside the legal 
constraints of the State. This approach assigned minimal formal organisation to 




mafia-like groups, and emphasised the importance of cultural, symbolic and 
communicative factors such as the ability of mafiosi to exert violence, their emphasis 
on revenge and ritual murders, and their standing within the community. 
In stark contrast, more recent research has conceptualised Italian criminal 
organisations as a special form of economic enterprise (e.g., Gambetta, 1993), sharing 
corporation-like features. This latter approach, which could be labelled the ‘economic 
structure’ perspective, reduces the role of cultural elements that might underpin 
criminal organisations. However, it recognises the importance of a formal structure of 
governance within the group, and of formalised or quasi-formalised hierarchical 
relationships between members of criminal organisations. 
 Both approaches have made important contributions to the understanding of 
Italian criminal organisations and other mafia-like groups around the world. However, 
an important limitation of both approaches is that they tend to emphasise a single core 
feature of mafia groups, to the detriment of other important characteristics (Paoli, 
2003). In line with Paoli’s (2003) analysis, we contend that criminal organisations are 
best defined as entities characterised by a multiplicity of functions. Although these 
groups undoubtedly operate on the basis of a formal structure, their goals clearly go 
beyond the mere accumulation of resources and profits (Paoli, 2003; see also Allum 
& Sands, 2004; Toros & Mavelli, 2013). In particular, central to criminal 
organisations’ activities are the acquisition of status and the exercise of power over 
the communities they inhabit and the territories where they reside. In such territories, 
criminal organisations may replace the state and provide an alternative form of 
governance.  
Here, we follow Fukuyama in defining the most basic tenet of governance as 
the “ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services”, regardless of the 




political framework in which such ability is exerted (Fukuyama, 2013, p. 350; cf. 
Strange, 1996). In line with this definition, criminal organisations provide governance 
because they are able to regulate economic and social activities that take place within 
the community, producing and distributing legal and illegal goods and services 
(Skaperdas, 2001). They enforce sanctions and mediate in disputes among citizens 
and may even invest in and contribute to the creation of local infrastructures (Paoli, 
2003).  
Omertà 
 Criminal organisations are directly or indirectly involved in corruption and 
predatory crimes, including robbery, theft and fraud (Sung, 2004; von Lampe, 2016). 
Such crimes affect the community by increasing levels of fear and violence, and 
decreasing trust and well-being (Giordano, Cannizzaro, Tosto, Pavia & Di Blasi, 
2017; cf. Ciziceno & Travaglino, 2018). In addition, their presence is associated with 
greater corruption and lower economic growth (Van Dijk, 2007). 
 Despite these strongly negative consequences of criminal organisations’ 
presence, direct opposition to criminal organisations is rare. Local communities 
allegedly display a form of collective passivity towards these groups, a phenomenon 
known as “omertà” (Travaglino et al., 2014). Omertà – or ‘law of silence’ – is a 
cultural code that prescribes indifference to others’ illegal activity. This code involves 
the categorical prohibition of cooperation with law enforcement agencies, regardless 
of whether one participates in (internal omertà), merely observes, or even is victim of 
a crime (external omertà; Paoli, 2003). Criminal organisations use omertà to reduce 
dissent, perpetuate their control and avoid prosecution. Omertà is therefore one of the 
core social features that enables criminal organisations to sustain secret power 
through which to engage in extra-legal governance. A critical element of 




understanding why criminal organisations can persist therefore requires the 
examination of the social and cultural psychological underpinnings of omertà. This 
was the primary objective of our programme of research.  
Omertà: The Generalised Passivity and Fear Accounts. Different accounts 
have been proposed to explain omertà. In line with the characterological perspective, 
some of these explanations have focused on Southern Italians’ cultural or 
personological characteristics. Political scientists and sociologists have often argued 
that Southern Italians are culturally unable to engage in collective actions for the 
common good. Such inability to act collectively would in turn decrease these 
populations’ capacity to organise an effective resistance against criminal 
organisations.  
For instance, Banfield (1958, p. 83) contended that Southern Italians’ 
behaviour could be explained as adherence to the following law: ‘maximise the 
material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do 
likewise’. As a corollary of this ethos of generalised passivity – which Banfield 
termed amoral familism – Southern Italians would show a disregard for public affairs, 
and a profound distrust for institutional authorities (see Foschi & Lauriola, 2016, for a 
recent critique and analysis; see also Schneider & Schneider, 1994). Putnam (1993) 
attributed Southern Italian’s ethos of passivity to lack of civic capacity, arguing that a 
sequence of autocratic and absolutist regimes dating back to the 13th century means 
that Southern Italians never developed the social capital necessary for civic 
engagement. Similarly, Gambetta (1988; 1993) conceptualised the mafia as emanating 
from a society permeated by low levels of trust due to past regimes. According to 
Gambetta, in a low-trust society such as the Southern Italian one, groups like the 




mafia may emerge to guarantee – thanks to their reputation for violence – transactions 
among individuals and offer protection.  
An alternative account of omertà equates this phenomenon with fear of 
retaliation. Mafia-type groups appropriate the state’s monopoly of violence (Marshall, 
2013; Skaperdas & Syropoulos, 1995). They employ intimidation and violence to 
achieve their objectives. For instance, they may decide to punish, even with death, 
those who disobey their commands. The resulting fear provides such groups with a 
powerful means of social control because fear precludes individuals from rebelling 
and reporting criminal organisations’ crimes to the authorities (cf. Giordano, 
Cannizzaro, Tosto, Pavia & Di Blasi, 2017; Roberti, 2008).  
Shortcomings of Previous Accounts of Omertà. Accounts of omertà based 
on assumptions of generalised passivity and fear are problematic in several respects 
(see Schneider & Schneider, 2003; Silverman, 1968; Tarrow, 1996). Notably, they 
tend to overlook important elements of the ideological, social, and cultural context in 
which criminal organisations operate. Instead, they are based upon essentialised – and 
largely untested – assumptions about the ethos (or character) of Southern Italian 
people (Travaglino et al., 2014). By locating the origin of this ethos in the distant past, 
passivity accounts imply collective stagnation and ignore important variation within 
the regional population in its response to criminal organisations (Travaglino et al., 
2017). In addition, by emphasising goals such as (family-exclusive) gains, or the 
avoidance of punishment, these accounts reveal deep assumptions that mechanistic 
and simplistic instrumentality drives the social behaviour of this ‘other’, non-Northern 
American, non-Northern European population (see Schneider, 1998).   
We argue that a major shortcoming of these accounts is their implicit 
conceptualisation of criminal organisations’ social power as grounded in coercion. 




This conceptualisation limits the community’s role to that of passive spectators of 
criminal organisations’ actions. At the core of the passivity account lies the simple 
idea that criminal organisations’ control of the means of violence enables these 
criminal groups to seize control of the community (Skaperdas, 2001, p. 180). For 
instance, according to Skaperdas (2001; Skaperdas & Syropoulos, 1995), factors such 
as arduous geographies, sudden political change, legal prohibition of goods, and the 
social distance of some subgroups in society weaken the state’s capability to 
monopolise violence within its territories. This creates a vacuum which is then filled 
by organised (criminal) groups that possess the resources and skills to exercise 
violence, offer protection and terrorise people. The community either lacks the ethos, 
or thinks it is not in its interest, to coordinate an effective response to reinforce the 
state’s authority and ensure its own security (Skaperdas, 2001). Similarly, according 
to Gambetta, the fear that criminal organisations instil provides them with the 
capacity to control and regulate social and economic transactions within the 
community. The community’s inability to cooperate and the generalised lack of trust 
that permeates society prevent its members from self-organising in an effective 
manner.  
However, the assumed power of criminal organisations’ coercion is 
inconsistent with evidence of multiple instances in which civil society has shown 
resistance to and rebellion against criminal organisations (Schneider & Schneider, 
2003). Recent evidence suggests that collective action in repressive contexts is 
fuelled, rather than inhibited, by perceived risk (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016).  
More importantly, the emphasis on coercion also misrepresents the very nature 
of criminal organisations’ power (Clark, 2005). Our contention is that criminal 
organisations are able to displace the state and exercise some of the state’s functions 




(e.g., punishment, dispute mediation, regulation of economic activities) because they 
are able to claim legitimate authority over some segments of the population. There is 
little doubt that violence is a central feature of Italian criminal organisations. 
However, violence and the resulting fear are not – by themselves – the key elements 
that bestow power on these organisations or ensure obedience from the community. 
Rather, using ICAT, we argue that criminal organisations’ violence only becomes 
effective within an ideological and normative framework that construes such violence 
as an acceptable way of regulating social relationships in society. Our contention is 
that the framework that does this is that of honour cultures, specifically that of 
masculine honour-related values.  
Cultural Honour  
Honour is defined as the ‘value of a person in his [sic] own eyes, but also in 
the eyes of his society’ (Pitt-Rivers, 1965, p. 21). Honour is an important cultural 
code in many societies around the globe, including Mediterranean countries 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; Schneider, 1971), southern 
regions of the United States (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997) and Middle-Eastern countries 
(Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-Swing, & Ataca, 2012). In these cultures, individuals 
must be able to respond promptly to insults, as well as kindness, from other people 
(Leung & Cohen, 2011; Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016, 2018; Uskul & Cross, 2019; Uskul, Cross, Gunsoy, & 
Pelin, in press).  
To be honourable, individuals must carefully manage their reputation and 
conform to a set of social expectations (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Rodriguez Mosquera, et al., 
2002; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008). Such expectations vary according to 
different factors, the most relevant being the gender of the individual. For example, to 




preserve their social worth, women must respect norms of purity and sexual chastity. 
Men must instead acquire a tough reputation, demonstrating their ability to respond to 
insults and to use violence to defend their property, ‘their’ women and their family 
(Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012; Barnes, Brown, & Tamborski, 2012; Brown, 
Imura & Mayeux, 2014; Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009). 
Cultural honour may be conceptualised as a complex system of ideas, beliefs, 
practices and values aimed at regulating relationships and interactions in society. An 
important function of honour is to define what forms of violence are legitimate (Fiske 
& Rai, 2014). For example, cultural values of honour promote the private use of 
(male) violence and emphasise the importance of strength and revenge when one’s 
reputation is threatened. Importantly, such an emphasis on private violence implies a 
distance from, and even a rejection of, the centralised agencies of the state (cf. Blok, 
1981). Indeed, it has been hypothesised that cultures of honour have developed most 
fully in lawless environments, characterised by the lack of a central authority that is 
able to mediate and resolve disputes (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) or guarantee contracts. 
Under these conditions, one’s reputation (i.e., one’s value in the eyes of society) 
functions as an important deterrent to theft and violence.  
Empirical research has demonstrated that men’s endorsement of masculine 
honour-related values has important implications at the interpersonal level. For 
instance, men’s endorsement of values of honour and masculinity has been associated 
with a tendency to react more violently to insults (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & 
Schwarz, 1996). Masculine honour is also implied in the justification of violence 
against women in situations of infidelity (Gill, Strange & Roberts, 2014; Vandello & 
Cohen, 2003, 2008) because female infidelity threatens the reputation of the whole 
family. In honour cultures, violence used to defend one’s honour is perceived and 




judged differently from mere interpersonal aggression (cf. Mulders-Jones, 2013), 
although the latter can still be construed as a display of manliness and toughness. 
Here, we argue that these beliefs about violence embedded in honour cultures 
are not mere precursors of interindividual retaliation. Rather, one of the key 
unexamined functions of masculine honour is to regulate intergroup relationships by 
signalling who may use violence against whom, and when and how (cf. Fiske & Rai, 
2014), and by defining and legitimising hierarchical relationships between those who 
‘possess honour’ and those who do not. For instance, Barnes et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that both male and female individuals’ endorsement of masculine 
honour-related values is associated with more extreme reactions against terrorists who 
threaten their nation. Moreover, in line with ICAT we contend that, at the societal 
level, masculine honour-related values may be exploited ideologically by dominant 
groups such as criminal organisations to sustain power relationships within 
communities. 
Intracultural Appropriation Theory: Masculine Honour and Criminal 
Organisations.  We contend that criminal organisations appropriate and use values of 
masculinity and honour to gain legitimacy within the community. Thus, in the context 
of criminal organisations, masculine honour-related values function as a cultural 
ideology that sustains relations of domination between groups in society. To the 
extent that criminal organisations strategically exploit those values, their actions gain 
meaning and legitimacy, and may be deemed appropriate by individuals in relation to 
standards of masculinity and honour. 
Importantly, ICAT’s emphasis on the processes of strategic exploitation and 
social embedding eschews the cultural essentialism and the passivity inherent in 
previous conceptualisations of the relationship between criminal organisations and 




southern Italian communities. ICAT assigns an important role to cultural values in 
stimulating support for criminal organisations. However, it does not claim that these 
values per se lead individuals to condone criminal organisations’ actions. Rather, it 
posits that criminal organisations’ appropriation and strategic use of masculine 
honour-related values enable them to gain consent. Moreover, ICAT does not 
consider the community to be a passive agent, only motivated by fear. Instead, it 
emphasises that both criminal organisations and the community actively negotiate 
their relationship within a framework of shared (and contestable) meanings and 
symbols.  
There is some evidence for the processes of appropriation and representation 
postulated by ICAT in the context of criminal organisations. Anthropological 
accounts demonstrate that criminal organisations portray themselves as the 
embodiment of shared ideals of manhood and honour. Mafiosi purportedly kill only in 
order to punish deviations from the traditional codes of honour. They show 
intolerance of challenges and insults, and celebrate self-reliance, loyalty and 
reciprocity (Schneider & Schneider, 2003). Criminal organisations put forward heroic 
‘origin myths’ about their group that emphasise male potency and self-reliance 
(Schneider & Schneider, 1994). For example, the Sicilian mafia traces its origins to 
the ‘Blessed Paulists’, a mythical secret group of heroic outlaws who corrected 
wrongs without the help of the state.  
In addition, criminal organisations propagate their values within civil society 
using different media and strategies. For instance, the so-called neomelodici singers, 
local singers often directly linked to organised crime, use their performances to 
highlight the importance of values linked to omertà (Toros & Mavelli, 2013). 
Recently, newspaper articles have reported on the phenomenon of camorra (i.e., the 




Neapolitan mafia) bosses’ using social media such as Facebook to represent 
themselves publicly as ‘men of honour’, displaying pictures with weapons and 
posting about how they defy police forces and the state (e.g., Russo, 2016).  
Recently, we analysed a TV interview with Giuseppe Riina, the son of the 
mafia boss Toto’ Riina (Poppi et al., 2018). We showed how Giuseppe Riina used a 
vast array of discursive strategies to highlight the importance of values such as 
‘minding one’s own businesses’, or justifying, denying and legitimising mafia’s 
practices. In a similar vein, Saviano (2009, cited in Toros & Mavelli, 2013) has 
demonstrated how local (rather than national) press participate in the propagation of 
criminal organisations’ norms and languages, by using nicknames to refer to criminal 
organisations’ members, or labelling repentants (snitchers) as ‘infami’, i.e., shameful 
individuals.  
Those are all powerful channels through which criminal organisations engage 
in the processes of appropriation of cultural values and self-representation in the 
wider society. To the extent that such deeds and stories resonate with the values of 
some segment of the population, criminal organisations are able to gain consensus and 
promote codes such as omertà, thereby consolidating their secret power. We now 
review the empirical evidence for such a process. 
Empirical Evidence: Masculine Honour-related Values and Opposition to 
Criminal Organisations 
Previous approaches to understanding the relationship between communities 
and organised crime identified violence and intimidation as the bases of criminal 
organisations’ control over the territory and – by extension – of people’s omertà vis-
à-vis criminal organisations. In contrast, here we propose the novel idea that violence 
sustains secret power only to the extent that such violence is appropriate within the 




cultural framework of masculine honour. Masculine honour-related values promote 
male violence and intimidation as legitimate tools to regulate relationships and 
interactions. Thus, endorsement of these values should be associated with a more 
positive view of criminal organisations and lower intentions to oppose these groups.  
To test these proposals, we (Travaglino et al., 2014), conducted two studies to 
examine the association between individuals’ perceptions of masculine honour-related 
values and the central features of the notion of omertà. Specifically, we invited two 
samples of young people (age range 16-24) from a northern Italian (N = 121; 34 
males, 89 females and 1 unreported, Mage = 20.42; Study 1) and a southern Italian (N 
= 301; 152 males, 141 females and 8 unreported, Mage = 17.50; Study 2) region to 
take part in a survey measuring their endorsement of cultural values and their 
perception of organised crime groups. To measure masculine honour-related values, 
we adapted the Honor Ideology for Manhood scale developed by Barnes et al. (2012). 
This scale includes sixteen items measuring two important aspects of masculine 
honour-related values. Specifically, eight items measure the perception that male 
violence is a legitimate tool to defend one’s persona from insults and from attacks on 
one’s property and women (e.g., ‘A man has the right to act with physical aggression 
toward another man who flirts with wife’, ‘A man has the right to act with physical 
aggression toward another man who calls him an insulting name’) and eight items 
measuring the characteristics that define what a real man is (e.g., ‘A real man will 
never back down from a fight’, ‘A real man never lets himself be a “doormat” to other 
people’).  
This scale has two important features. First, it measures individuals’ generic 
approval of masculine honour-related violence in the abstract, rather than with respect 
to personal use of violence. This is in line with our proposition that what matters in 




shaping individuals’ perceptions of, and opposition to, criminal organisations is their 
view of the suitability of violence as a tool to regulate social relationships. Second, 
and relatedly, this generic focus of the scale means that it can be answered by both 
male and female participants. Although female participants are less likely to endorse a 
masculine honour ideology, they still play an important role in transmission of such 
values to future generations (Wyatt-Brown, 1982) and may hold ideas about the 
appropriateness of male violence in specific circumstances (Vandello, Cohen, et al., 
2008).  
In line with this reasoning, we (Travaglino et al., 2014) found a positive 
association between masculine honour-related values and individuals’ attitudes 
toward criminal organisations. The latter variable included two items and was 
operationalised as perceived legitimacy of criminal organisations’ actions and 
approval of their outcomes. Specifically, the more that individuals (male and female) 
endorsed values concerning the acceptability of male violence, and embraced beliefs 
concerning male toughness, the more likely they were to respond positively to items 
such as ‘Some aspects of mafia activity are legitimate’, and ‘Some actions of mafias 
may have positive direct or indirect consequences for the area where you live’ (Study 
1: β = .23, SE = .09, p = .01; Study 2: β = .49, SE = .06, p < .001). In turn, these more 
positive attitudes towards criminal organisations were associated with weaker 
intentions to engage in collective action to oppose criminal organisations (Study 1: β 
= -.21, SE = .09, p = .02; Study 2: β = -.27, SE = .05, p < .001). This created a 
negative indirect effect of masculine honour values on individuals’ intentions to 




engage in collective action to oppose criminal organisations. Figure 2 illustrates the 
basic process of omertà hypothesised in Travaglino et al. (2014).  
This association lies at the very heart of the idea of omertà and supports the 
idea that masculine honour-related values are implicated in the legitimisation of 
criminal organisations. In fact, we found that this association remained significant 
when we controlled for demographic variables such as age and gender (Travaglino et 
al., 2014), and social orientations such as the System Justification Scale (Jost & 
Hunyady, 2003; Study 2), or political orientation (Study 1).  
Across both studies, we also measured individuals’ perceptions of the risk 
entailed by opposing criminal organisations, to control for the potential role of this 
construct in in individuals’ intentions to oppose these groups. Supporting our tenet 
that legitimisation rather than fear is the main reason for individuals’ lack of 
opposition against criminal organisations, we found no relationship between 
perceived risk and individuals’ intentions to oppose criminal organisations.  
The indirect effect of masculine honour-related values on individuals’ 
intentions to oppose criminal organisations has been replicated in several studies 
(Travaglino et al., 2014; Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura & Russo, 2015; 
Travaglino, Abrams & Russo, 2017; see Table 1) and samples. The fact that this 
indirect effect was also found in a Northern Italian sample of university students 
(Travaglino et al., 2014, Study 1) suggests that this process also generalises to 
contexts which are not generally seen as honour cultures (Knight & Nisbett, 2007). 
Specifically, results from Travaglino et al. (2014, Study 1) suggest that even in 
circumstances where those values are not dominant at the collective level, their 
endorsement at the individual level may function as a legitimising ideology. This is 




because there is a match between the agent’s self-presentation and individuals’ 
values. 
An important subsequent question is whether masculine honour-related values 
play a specific and unique role vis-à-vis legitimisation of criminal organisations or, 
whether other sub-codes pertaining to this cultural syndrome also play a role in 
individuals’ legitimisation of criminal organisations. Honour is a complex cultural 
syndrome that encompasses beliefs about how both men and women should act in 
social settings (Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016; Uskul et al., in press). Prescriptions about 
male and female behaviour are likely to be shared, regardless of individuals’ gender. 
Thus, adherence to these prescriptions indicates adherence to shared rules and norms 
regulating individuals’ behaviours and their interaction. In addition to these 
prescriptions, individuals also have subjective beliefs about the personal importance 
of reputation and honour. Unlike normative prescriptions, these subjective beliefs 
about honour are likely to be gender-specific and to conform to the behavioural ideals 
related to the particular gender (Travaglino et al., 2017).  
Travaglino et al. (2017) examined the role of these different components of 
honour vis-à-vis individuals’ attitudes towards criminal organisations, and their 
intentions to oppose these groups. We used the Honour Ideology for Manhood scale 
(Barnes et al., 2012) to measure individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour-
related values, as above. In addition, we measured individuals’ endorsement of 
prescriptive values about women’s behaviour, using the Honor Ideology for 
Womanhood scale (Barnes et al., 2014). This includes items such as ‘A respectable 
woman never betrays her husband’ and ‘A good woman teaches her children the 
importance of family traditions’. Similar to the Honor Ideology for Manhood scale, it 
can be answered by both male and female participants. Finally, we measured 




individuals’ subjective beliefs about the importance of honour-related values using 
Rodriguez Mosquera et al.’s (2008) Honour Values Scale. The Honour Values Scale 
includes items tapping participants’ concern for their own and their family’s 
reputation, such as, ‘It is important to me that others see me as someone who deserves 
respect’ and ‘Caring about the implications of my actions for my family’s social 
image is important to me’. 
Travaglino et al., (2017) invited 1,173 participants from three high schools in 
Campania (a southern Italian region) to complete questionnaires (Mage = 16.69; 643 
males and 514 females). Results from this sample demonstrated that, across genders, 
stronger masculine honour-related values had a unique role in predicting positive 
attitudes towards criminal organisations (β = .31, SE = 0.04, p < .001), and weaker 
intentions to oppose criminal organisations collectively (β = −.16, SE = 0.05, p < 
.001). These associations remained significant when also controlling for the other 
features of honour, system justification beliefs and social dominance orientation. In 
contrast, both the Honour Ideology for Womanhood and the Honour Values scales 
had no significant association with the other variables (p > .80), supporting the idea 
that criminal organisations draw legitimacy from honour-related beliefs about 
manhood, in particular, rather than honour codes in general.  
Interestingly, only the Honour Values Scale’s scores predicted individuals’ 
intentions to oppose criminal organisations differently as a function of gender. 
Specifically, only among male participants was the Honour Values Scale significantly 
associated with lower intention to oppose criminal organisations (b = −.18, SE = 0.05, 
p = .002). This relationship was not significant among female participants (b = −.03, 
SE = 0.07, p = .70). Moreover, separate analyses regressing intentions to oppose 
criminal organisations on the Honor Values Scale indicated that the relationship was 




significantly stronger for male (β = −.14, SE = 0.04) than for female (β = −.02, SE = 
0.04) participants, zdiff = −2.11, p = .035. We speculated that this was because the 
personal importance assigned to honour-related values per se (as measured by Honor 
Values Scale) was closer to masculine honour-related values (Honour Ideology for 
Manhood Scale) for male participants, whereas it matched more closely the feminine 
honour-related values (Honor Ideology for Womanhood) for female participants. 
Thus, this finding provides further support for the idea that masculine honour values 
play a unique role in granting legitimacy to criminal organisations.    
Masculine Honour and Omertà. In Travaglino et al. (2014, Study 2), we 
investigated additional central features of the notion of omertà. We drew on different 
research traditions in psychology and theoretical frameworks to operationalise the two 
major elements of the notion of omertà: i) the prescription of indifference towards 
others’ illegal activities; and ii) the prohibition of cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies (Paoli, 2003).  
According to Klandermans (1984), individuals’ engagement in collective 
action, such as opposing criminal organisations, is motivated by different factors. An 
important motive concerns the extent to which individuals grant value to the goal of 
collective mobilisation. This ‘collective motive’ is grounded in the value-expectancy 
framework (Klandermans, 1984; see Feather, 1982). It is defined as the interaction 
between the value individuals attach to achieving the goal of collective mobilisation 
(e.g., defeating criminal organisations) and their expectation of being able to achieve 
such a goal through a collective effort. The interactive term means that an individual 
must not only value a specific goal to engage in collective action, but also expect to 
be able to achieve it through joint effort. This construct therefore seems to fit well as a 
proxy for omertà’s dictate of apathy towards others’ illegal activities.  




To operationalise the prohibition of collaboration with law enforcement 
agencies, Travaglino et al. (2014) measured individuals’ perceived anxiety in 
situations of contact with the police (Viki, Culmer, Eller, & Abrams, 2006). Drawing 
on the work of Eller and colleagues (Eller et al., 2007; Viki et al., 2006), and 
Bowman’s (2006) analysis of honour in modern society, we reasoned that in a context 
characterised by cultural honour, contact with the police would contravene shared 
norms of masculinity and self-reliance. In addition, in such a context, anticipated 
contact with the police may generate distrust and threat in people. This is because the 
police are representatives of a central authority that is distrusted and questioned. 
Thus, we hypothesised, in line with the notion of omertà, that people who more 
strongly endorse masculine honour-related values are likely to perceive greater threat 
in relation to the police.  
Results from Travaglino et al. (2014, Study 2) supported the importance of 
individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour-related values in predicting the basic 
components of omertà. In addition to holding more favourable attitudes towards 
criminal organisations, individuals who endorsed masculine honour-related values 
perceived more threat from possible interaction with the police (β = .17, SE = .07, p = 
.002), and were more indifferent towards criminal organisations’ illegal activities (β = 
.18, SE = .64, p = .002).  
Thus, these findings support our empirical map of the potential psychological 
processes involved in the notion of omertà. In particular, they are consistent with a 
central tenet of ICAT, that masculine honour-related values generate distance from 
institutional authorities while at the same time legitimising criminal organisations. 




Moral Emotions. Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura and Russo (2014) 
provided further supportive evidence concerning the role of masculine honour-related 
values in the legitimisation of criminal organisations. We examined the emotional 
process involved in the perception of these groups in the form of vicarious shame. 
Shame is an important social emotion that signals a negative appraisal of an event or 
action (Iyer & Leach, 2009). Individuals feel ashamed of their actions when they feel 
that they are unworthy or fail to meet important moral standards (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; 
Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Shame can motivate actions aimed at 
restoring one’s group’s moral worth (Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006) and can be 
experienced vicariously, on behalf of the wrongdoing of another relevant individual 
or group (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005).  
Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura and Russo (2014) asked a sample of 
170 participants (Mage = 16.17; 79 males and 84 females, 13 unreported) from a 
southern Italian high school in Campania to report how ashamed they would feel in 
response to the wrongdoings of local criminal organisations. Specifically, in order to 
highlight the public dimension of criminal organisations’ actions, participants were 
asked to think of instances in which they ‘learned of news concerning Camorra’s 
wrongdoing on the local, national, or international media’ (p. 7). The authors also 
measured individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour-related values, attitudes 
towards criminal organisations, feelings of vicarious guilt, system justification beliefs, 
and perceived risk. These variables were used as predictors of collective intentions to 
oppose criminal organisations.   
The more that individuals embraced masculine honour-related values, the less 
likely they were to feel ashamed in response to criminal organisations’ actions (b = 
−.24, SE = .12, p = .04). This finding remained significant after controlling for all the 




other predictors mentioned above. In turn, lower vicarious shame was associated with 
lower intentions to oppose criminal organisations (b = .22, SE = .08, p = .009). The 
indirect effect of masculine honour-related values on collective intentions via 
vicarious shame was significant after controlling for attitudes towards criminal 
organisations (b = −.05, SE = .03, 95% CI = −.13, −.003). 
These results provide further support for the idea that masculine honour-
related values legitimise the actions of criminal organisations. Individuals who 
endorse these values are also less likely to perceive criminal organisations’ 
wrongdoings as immoral. They subsequently report less motivation to oppose this 
group.  
Social Identity, Regional Membership and Opposition to Criminal 
Organisations.  In both studies reported by Travaglino et al. (2014), we also explored 
the association between regional identification and masculine honour-related values. 
According to social identity theory (SIT), individuals’ membership in social groups is 
associated with specific clusters of cultural values, norms and attitudes (Halloran & 
Kashima, 2006; Tajfel, 1978). Due to the specific history of the country, regional 
identities are particularly relevant in the Italian context (Levy, 1996). These identities 
may carry different values and norms due to different historical patterns, geographies 
and access to resources (Schneider, 1971). Thus, in Italy, honour-related values may 
be salient and important for certain regional identities, but not others.   
 There is some initial evidence for this proposition. In the northern Italian 
sample (Study 1), there was no significant association between a regional 
identification and individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour-related values (β = 
.15, SE = .06, p = .09). However, in the southern Italian sample (Study 2) this 




association was positive and significant, β = .33, SE = .05, p < .001. Individuals who 
identified more strongly with the regional identity of Campania (the southern region 
where the study was carried out) were more likely to endorse masculine honour-
related values, which in turn legitimise organised crime. These differences in findings 
between northern and southern regions must be interpreted with caution. The samples 
were different in many respects, including age. In addition, the provenance of the 
northern Italian sample included different regions. Nonetheless, the evidence is 
suggestive of the idea that southern Italian social identities are more strongly 
associated with values and beliefs of masculinity and honour. Yet, regardless of the 
regional group membership, across geographical areas, the extent to which 
individuals endorse these values predicts their attitudes towards, and intentions to 
oppose criminal organisations. 
 The linkage between individuals’ regional identity, masculine honour-related 
values and criminal organisations is often emphasised by mafiosi themselves in 
Southern Italy. In line with ICAT, they accentuate this connection in order to acquire 
social influence and present themselves as the prototypical representations of 
traditional local values of masculinity (see also Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). For 
instance, in their article’s epigraph, Travaglino et al. (2015) quoted the following 
words from the mafioso Vizzini. When asked if he was indeed a mafioso, Vizzini 
answered, “As you see, I am a mafioso in our way, in the Sicilian way, giving what I 
can to those in need, respecting and making myself respected, not tolerating bullying 
against the weak, respecting the honour of others, and ensuring my own [honour] is 
respected” (translated in Paoli, 2003, p. 184). In this answer, Vizzini establishes a 
linkage between Sicilian regional identity (a southern Italian regional identity) and the 
mafioso identity through the notions of respect, toughness and masculinity. These 




traditional values are often propagated by mafia members and described as being the 
cornerstone of the mafia group (Poppi et al., 2018). 
 The association between group identity and omertà was further examined by 
Travaglino et al. (2015). We reasoned that individuals may simultaneously belong to 
different groups that may, in turn, propagate different social norms. Travaglino et al.’s 
(2014) findings suggested that honour is an important concern in southern Italy. Yet, 
those same cultural values and norms may become less relevant vis-à-vis other groups 
to which individuals also belong (Maitner, Mackie, Pauketat, & Smith, 2017; 
Rodriguez Mosquera, 2016).  
 A very interesting group membership to examine in the context of criminal 
organisations is national group membership and identification with the nation. 
Identification with a group or category is generally associated with a sense of 
attachment to the group and loyalty, whereas weaker identification with the category 
is linked to disloyalty and intentions to exit (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Travaglino, 
Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Pinto, 2014). Stronger national 
identification may imply stronger trust in the government and in the other central 
administrative agencies that regulate institutional life (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). These 
observations suggest that higher identification with the nation may mean less 
tolerance for alternative powerful agents that displace the state and enact governance 
in its place. More importantly, identification with the nation may mean that 
individuals are less prone to espouse an ideology of male self-reliance originating 
from a lawless environment where a reputation for violence and toughness plays a 
central role in conflict resolution. 
 To test this idea, Travaglino et al. (2015) measured both individuals’ national 
(Italy) and regional (Campania) identification in a sample of 170 (88 males, 81 




females and 2 unreported, Mage = 16.46) participants from a southern Italian high 
school. They found a positive association between the two levels of identification (r = 
.35 p < .001). This is not surprising in view of the fact that regional identity is nested 
within national identity.  Nevertheless, these two levels of identification had different 
associations with masculine honour-related values and, indirectly, with individuals’ 
intentions to collectively oppose criminal organisations. Specifically, replicating the 
previous study (Travaglino, et al., 2014), individuals’ regional identification was 
positively associated with their endorsement of masculine honour-related values in 
southern Italy (β = .28, SE = 0.07, p = .001). These values are normative for this 
specific group membership. There was a negative indirect effect of regional 
identification, via masculine honour-related values, on intentions to oppose criminal 
organisations (β = -.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI =0.15 to 0.02). In contrast, national 
identification was negatively associated with the masculine honour ideology (β = -.25, 
SE = 0.06, p < .001). In line with our theorising, this in turn created a positive indirect 
effect of national identification on individuals’ intentions to oppose criminal 
organisations (β = .06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = 0.005 to 0.12). Thus, these distinctive 
levels of group membership had different associations with cultural norms of 
masculine honour. Cultural norms are central to the legitimation of criminal 
organisations, but the relative salience of different group memberships (regional vs. 
national) has implications for the weight that individuals lend to these norms, and 
consequently for their intentions to oppose these groups.  
Regional Identity, Social Change and the Role of Culture. The research 
described so far suggests that individuals’ identification with a southern regional 
identity is indirectly associated with individuals’ support for, or at least lack of 
opposition to, criminal organisations. This proposition may initially appear congruent 




with the characterological perspective, and specifically with early social scientists’ 
claims that mafia-type groups were an expression of local attitudes and characteristics 
(e.g., Blok, 1988; Hess, 1973).  Indeed, the findings seem to lend support to 
Banfield’s (1958) or Putnam’s (1994) idea that southern Italians share a set of 
attitudes and beliefs that make them unable to act collectively for the common good 
(i.e., getting rid of the mafia). Specifically, masculine honour-related values which are 
important to a regional southern Italian identity, but not to a regional northern Italian 
or national group memberships, are key predictors of more positive attitudes towards 
criminal organisations, and lower intentions to engage in collective action against 
criminal organisations. 
 However, we propose a more nuanced interpretation of these findings, rooted 
in the theoretical idea, and recent empirical evidence, that social identities are 
characterised by different types of ‘content’, that is they are imbued with different 
meanings, values and norms (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Turner-Zwinkels, van 
Zomeren, & Postmes, 2015). The same group membership may motivate very 
different behaviours, depending on which type of content is mobilised. Thus, the 
relationship between a southern Italian group membership and lack of collective 
mobilisation against criminal organisations is not unequivocal or deterministic but is 
more likely to depend on the type of belief structure and ideology that is activated 
within the group.   
 To substantiate this interpretation, Travaglino et al. (2017) also examined an 
alternative set of beliefs that play an important role in mobilising groups towards 
collective action, namely social change beliefs. Social change beliefs are part of the 
broader social identity account of collective action (see Abrams, 1990; Tajfel, 1978). 
They form a belief structure indicating that “when the current social system is under 




the control of a dominant outgroup, the ingroup’s illegitimately low, but stable, status 
can only be improved if there is a major societal change” (Abrams & Grant, 2012, p. 
676). In other words, they refer to individuals’ beliefs that drastic structural change is 
needed to improve the group’s negative status in the intergroup context (Travaglino et 
al., 2017).  
The importance of this belief structure was first hypothesised in Tajfel’s 
(1978) account of collective action. However, the empirical examination and 
measurement of these beliefs is considerably more recent (Abrams & Grant, 2012; 
Grant, Bennett & Abrams, 2017). For instance, in previous research in the context of 
Scottish nationalism, Abrams and Grant (2012) demonstrated that these beliefs were 
predicted by individuals’ strength of identification with the ingroup. In turn, they 
were an important mediator of the relationship between identification and the group’s 
involvement in political action (i.e., voting). Stronger group identification means that 
group-level problems acquire more personal importance because the group becomes a 
more relevant part of the self. Individuals are thus more likely to seek opportunities 
for collective radical change and improvement. 
In the context of criminal organisations, this means that individuals who 
identify more strongly with their regional group membership should also place more 
importance on the need for radical change vis-à-vis criminal organisations’ damaging 
presence in the region. This should in turn translate into stronger intentions to 
collectively oppose criminal organisations. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, 
stronger identification with a southern regional group is linked to values of 
masculinity and honour, which play an important role in legitimising the presence of 
criminal organisations in the region, and their social power.  




Travaglino et al. (2017) examined the articulation between identity, masculine 
honour-related values, and intentions to oppose criminal organisations in a sample of 
1,173 individuals from Campania in southern Italy. They hypothesised a dual route 
from social identity to collective opposition to criminal organisations, according to 
which regional identity has simultaneous but countervailing associations with 
individuals’ intentions to oppose criminal organisations, depending on the specific set 
of beliefs taken into consideration. The Honour Ideology for Manhood scale (Barnes 
et al., 2012) was used to measure individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour. To 
measure the social change belief structure, we adapted items from Abrams and Grant 
(2012) and asked individuals to rate their agreement with statements such as ‘The 
situation in Campania can improve only if the Camorra is defeated completely’, 
‘People in Campania will only improve their situation if the Camorra is completely 
eliminated’ and ‘Without the presence of the Camorra, things in Campania would be 
worse’ (reverse scored).  
In line with ICAT’s central contention that cultural values may be used by a 
dominant group to acquire legitimacy at the expense of a subordinate group, 
Travaglino et al. (2017) found that masculine honour values were negatively 
associated with individuals’ social change beliefs (β = −.17, SE = 0.05, p < .001). The 
more that individuals embraced values of honour and masculinity, the less likely they 
were to believe in the necessity for radical change to improve the group’s standing. 
More importantly, we also found support for our dual route hypothesis.  
Specifically, individuals’ regional identification had opposing indirect effects 
on their intentions to collectively oppose criminal organisations, depending on the 
specific set of beliefs considered (see Figure 3). In line with previous research, this 
social identity was positively associated with individuals’ endorsement of masculine 




honour values (β = .15, SE = 0.04, p < .001), and there was a significant negative 
indirect effect of identity on individuals’ collective intentions to oppose criminal 
organisations via masculine honour values (β = −.024, SE = 0.01, 95% CI = −0.046, 
−0.008). In line with Abrams and Grant’s (2012; see also Grant et al., 2017) 
theorising, regional identity was also positively associated with social change beliefs 
(β = .09, SE = 0.05, p = .02), and there was a positive indirect effect of identification 
on collective intentions to oppose criminal organisations via social change beliefs (β = 
.04, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = 0.006, 0.072).  
These findings are important because they demonstrate that southern Italian 
regional identification has no inherent and deterministic ‘feature’, or ‘ethos’ that 
renders it unable to engage collectively against criminal organisations. More 
prosaically, and in line with the way in which other dominant groups achieve and 
maintain their hegemonic status in society (Leach & Livingstone, 2015; Reicher, 
2004), this group membership is linked to various sets of values and belief structures. 
Such values and beliefs may be more or less functional for the maintenance of the 
status quo. In line with ICAT, they may also be appropriated by groups to legitimise 
their secret power. 
Contact with criminal organisations’ members. Thus far, we have 
discussed evidence pertaining to the cognitive and emotional correlates of the 
masculine honour ideology vis-à-vis criminal organisations, as well as the 
implications of such ideology for individuals’ intentions to oppose organised crime 
groups collectively. Recently, Travaglino and Drury (2018) analysed other measures 
from the studies by Travaglino et al. (2014) and Travaglino et al. (2015) to investigate 
an additional implication of masculine honour-related ideology. Specifically, they 




tested the role that this ideology plays in motivating young people to have contact 
with members of criminal organisations. 
 Unlike the Japanese Yakuza (i.e., the Japanese mafia), for instance, 
membership in mafia-type groups such as the camorra and mafia is a crime under 
Italian law (Hill, 2003). Organised crime groups in Italy are therefore secret, 
concealed societies (Paoli, 2003). Members of criminal organisations have to hide the 
fact that they belong to these groups or risk surveillance and prosecution by the state.  
Yet, at the same time, members of criminal organisations must be recognised 
within the community in order to use the organisation’s resources, exert their political 
power and gain respect. Indeed, an important feature of the form of ‘traditional 
authority’ described by Weber (1978) is how the authority exercises governance. 
Rather than the impersonal bond of the ‘duty of office’, traditional authority is based 
on personal loyalties and obedience. The absence of formal principles of command 
requires direct contact between authorities and the followers.  
In line with this account, anthropologists who have studied the mafia (e.g., 
Schneider & Schneider, 2003) have noted the remarkable way in which members of 
these groups establish an intricate set of reciprocal relationships at different levels of 
society. Members of criminal organisations interact with politicians, business leaders 
and other members of the community, exchanging favours and creating obligations. In 
addition, young boys are attracted by the status that membership in these groups could 
afford and are sometimes tempted to offer their services to members of criminal 
organisations or simply strive to spend time in their company (Travaglino et al., 
2014).  
A robust finding in social psychology is that positive contact with outgroup 
members is associated with more positive attitudes towards the outgroup (Brown & 




Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This ‘contact framework’ is generally 
used to improve intergroup relations in the context of immigration or between 
majority and minority members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This framework 
emphasises the importance of situational encounters for improving intergroup 
attitudes. Nonetheless, recent research has demonstrated that individual difference 
factors, such as individuals’ social attitudes or personality traits, also play a key role, 
facilitating or inhibiting the type of contact in which individuals engage (Hodson & 
Dhont, 2015; Jackson & Poulsen, 2005; Turner, Dhont, Hewstone, Prestwich, & 
Vonofakou, 2014). Contact, in turn, may also have an impact on individuals’ traits 
and social attitudes (Vezzali, Turner, Capozza & Trifiletti, 2017). 
Travaglino and Drury (2019) drew on this evidence to reason that cultural 
values may also play an important role in shaping individuals’ experience of contact. 
ICAT contends that cultural values are instrumental in organising individuals’ social 
reality, signalling what is appropriate and distinguishing it from what should be 
avoided (see also Brewer & Yuki, 2014). Like other social values, cultural values can 
be shaped by the encounters experienced by an individual.  
Thus, Travaglino and Drury (2019, Study 1) drew on samples from Travaglino 
et al. (2014; Time 1) and Travaglino et al. (2015; Time 2) and performed longitudinal 
analyses of 176 participants (NT1 = 176, NT2 = 170) to examine two hypotheses. 
Specifically, they tested whether cultural values of honour and masculinity are 
antecedents of individuals’ frequency of contact with members of criminal 
organisations. They derived this hypothesis from ICAT, which states that values of 
honour and masculinity play a pivotal role in legitimising these groups, making them 
more acceptable. They also tested the alternative hypothesis that contact with these 
groups predicts changes in individuals’ endorsement of masculine honour values. This 




hypothesis was derived from the observations by criminologists such as Sutherland 
(1937) suggesting that encounters with individuals with criminogenic attitudes results 
in a diffusion of these attitudes.  
Results from this study provided support for the former, but not the latter, 
hypothesis. Specifically, individuals who endorsed masculine honour-related values 
were more likely to report frequent contact with members of criminal organisations 
five months later. On the other hand, frequency of contact with members of criminal 
organisations at Time 1 did not predict changes in masculine honour-related values at 
Time 2. The findings were therefore consistent with ICAT (see Figure 4).  
Criminal organisations present themselves as the embodiment of masculinity 
and honour and they strategically emphasise behaviours that conform to those ideals. 
Thus, contact with their members could result in a heightened perception that these 
people are worthy of respect and have a high sense of honour, or that they belong to 
the history of the region. In a second cross-sectional study involving a sample of N = 
314 (152 males, 154 females, 8 unreported) from a different southern Italian school, 
Travaglino and Drury (2019) started exploring some implications of contact with 
members of criminal organisations. Specifically, they examined whether contact with 
members predicted individuals’ perceptions that criminal organisations match the 
ideals of honour and respect (the ‘romanticisation’ of the group). A cross-sectional 
structural equation model supported this contention. Individuals’ endorsement of 
masculine honour-related values predicted more frequent contact with members of 
criminal organisations (β = .26, SE = .010, p < .001), which in turn predicted a 
stronger romanticisation of these groups (β = .28, SE = .05, p < .001). The indirect 
effect of masculine honour-related values on romanticisation of the group via was 
significant, β = .07, SE = .03, 95% CI = .02 to .13.  




Theoretical Implications, Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 We have described a novel theoretical framework, ICAT, aimed at explaining 
how illegal and extra-legal non-state agents acquire secret power over a community 
(see Figure 1). We used the theory to derive an empirical model of omertà, specifying 
that masculine honour-related values have important implications for the way in 
which communities perceive and engage with organised crime groups (Figure 5 
presents a conceptual summary of the model). We used the southern Italian context as 
a prototypical case study, and below we will consider both our conclusions from that 
case and our contention that these are likely to generalise to other contexts.  
First, our evidence contradicts some prevailing assumptions about criminal 
organisations. Criminal organisations’ relationships with communities in the southern 
Italian context are unlikely to be grounded solely in fear or coercion. Indeed, fear and 
coercion are ill-suited to securing a stable relationship of domination over the 
population and are likely to evoke reactance and resistance (Turner, 2005; Tyler, 
2006). There is also no evidence for the proposition that southern Italians are 
characterised by an ethos that makes them inherently unable to act collectively for the 
common good. Such a view could be seen as overly pessimistic and also unjustifiably 
demeaning whilst also entertaining no real options for social change.  
Therefore, we argue that it is useful to reconceptualise the relationship 
between criminal organisations and the community as a relationship of domination 
and subjugation. Criminal organisations aim to exert political and economic power 
over the population. They do so by appropriating, emphasising and propagating an 
ideology of masculinity and violence. The masculine honour ideology prescribes male 
violence as a legitimate tool for resolving social conflicts between individuals and 
groups in society. This ideology is linked to a spirit of self-reliance and distance from 




the state and its agencies (Bowman, 2006). It therefore creates a space where criminal 
organisations’ use of violence and intimidation becomes appropriate, legitimate and 
even commendable. 
In line with this reasoning, individuals who embrace this ideology are more 
likely to report positive attitudes towards criminal organisations, lower emotional 
reactions of shame about criminal organisations’ wrongdoings, and weaker beliefs 
about the necessity for radical change vis-à-vis the presence of criminal organisations 
within the region. In addition, the evidence suggests that masculine honour-related 
values may be an important set of norms associated with a specific southern Italian 
regional identity (Campania). These values play a key role in motivating young 
people to engage in more frequent contact with CO members.  
Nonetheless, these conclusions must be interpreted in the context of the 
limitations of this research. Most notably, with the exception of Travaglino and 
Drury’s (2019; study 1) longitudinal analyses, the studies described in this article are 
correlational and cross-sectional. Thus, we are unable to make causal claims 
concerning the order of the variables in the models.  
Future research should use longitudinal and experimental methodologies to 
examine empirically some of the causal links hypothesised in this research. For 
instance, future work could manipulate the salience and relevance for individuals of 
masculine honour-related values. Alternatively, it could manipulate the extent to 
which the behaviour of members of criminal organisations adhere to such values. 
These manipulations would enable us to draw stronger causal conclusions regarding 
how individuals’ endorsement of, and criminal organisations’ adherence to, values of 
masculine honour affects individuals’ appraisals of these groups, as well as the 
collective intentions to oppose them.   




 Below, we discuss future directions for this programme of research. In so 
doing, we also highlight additional limitations of the current work and clarify some 
important aspects of Intracultural Appropriation Theory (ICAT). We also discuss the 
generalisability of the model to other contexts and situations in which secret power 
may take root. Specifically, we focus our attention on four key issues, namely how 
criminal organisations disseminate their values in the social context; the implications 
of the model for theories of political action; the importance of broadening social 
scientific perspectives on masculine honour; and the generalisability of the model to 
different contexts and types of groups.  
Criminal Organisations and the Propagation of Cultural Values 
 ICAT contends that cultural values play a central role in providing non-state 
agents with the ability to exert secret power (in the forms of social influence, extra-
legal governance and control). In line with this idea, cultural values of masculine 
honour bestow criminal organisations with legitimacy and, ultimately, social 
influence and power. However, it is important to state that the existence of mafia-like 
groups is not caused by such values. Many societies around the world that are 
characterised by values of honour have not produced groups like the mafia. Moreover, 
mafia-like organisations (or gangs with similar features) have emerged in contexts 
where masculine honour is not a dominant cultural syndrome (e.g., the Yakuza or the 
Triads in the ‘face cultures’ of Japan and Southern China, respectively). Unlike the 
characterological perspective, we do not contend that criminal organisations originate 
from culture. The origins of Italian criminal organisations are traceable to the 
formation of the Italian nation state, and to the struggle among powerful groups in 
that period (Schneider & Schneider, 2003).  




 Thus, according to ICAT, culture does not cause the existence of non-state 
agents, such as criminal organisations, terrorist groups or gangs. Rather, cultural 
values provide a vehicle for such groups to acquire and sustain power. Specifically, 
ICAT posits two processes. First, groups such as criminal organisations must actively 
appropriate, amplify and reinforce local cultural values to achieve their objectives. 
Second, they must successfully portray themselves as the embodiment of such values 
to the community. For instance, criminal organisations portray themselves as the 
embodiment of values of respect, masculinity and honour, while magnifying the 
importance and relevance of such values to their local context. In so doing, they play 
an active role in the dissemination of these values in society.  
The channels and modalities through which criminal organisations 
disseminate these values and propagate their ideas are an important and under-
investigated topic that is ripe for future research. Research is needed to examine the 
different ways mafia-type groups communicate with the community, the types of 
narratives and discourses they advance to amplify values of masculinity and honour, 
and how criminal organisations’ symbolic use of violence and their display of 
strength facilitate their stance as men of honour (Campbell, 2012; Schneider & 
Schneider, 2008).  
This is undoubtedly a very challenging area of research, bearing in mind the 
risks associated with closely scrutinising criminal organisations’ discourses, as well as 
the difficulties in finding sufficient materials. Nonetheless, there are some promising 
avenues for empirical investigation. For example, Campbell (2012) points out that 
cartels in Mexico engage in narco-propaganda to maximise their political power and 
gain legitimacy. Acts of propaganda may include the symbolic display of violence, 




the dissemination of written statements through graffiti and ‘street art’, use of social 
media, control and censorship of mass-media, and the use music and lyrics.  
Above we discussed some similar devices used by organised criminal groups 
in Italy to strategically exploit cultural values of masculinity and honour. In addition, 
young people’s engagement and contact with members of criminal organisations may 
result in the dissemination of norms and ideas that emphasise criminal organisations’ 
adherence to values of honour, and the romanticisation of this group (Travaglino & 
Drury, 2019). Nonetheless, the social norms that are established through exposure to 
members of criminal organisations and their discourses and actions need further 
investigation, using longitudinal studies and experimental approaches. In addition, 
research should examine the extent and limits of criminal organisations’ reach 
(regional, social and ethnolinguistic) in representing themselves as the embodiment of 
honour and masculinity.  
Culture and Political Action 
 The current programme of research has wider implications for conceptualising 
the role of cultural values in theories of political behaviour and collective action. In 
social psychology, the study of culture and the investigation of the dynamics of 
oppression and resistance have been separate endeavours (see Wolf, 1999; cf. also 
van Zomeren & Louis, 2017). Similarly, our understanding of the interplay between 
culture, ideology and legitimisation is still very limited (see Travaglino, 2017; 
Travaglino et al., 2014). Theories such as system justification theory or social 
dominance theory have mainly directed their efforts at the general (arguably 
universal) psychological processes that shape relations of domination among groups, 
whereas cultural psychology tends to endorse the importance of local values and 
beliefs for understanding how groups interact with each other.  




ICAT underlines the importance of culture in shaping individuals’ action (or 
inaction) in relation to a dominant group. Moreover, ICAT provides a framework for 
investigating the role of culture in the dynamics of legitimisation and subversion of 
the status quo. ICAT contends that culture provides individuals with a template for 
appraising reality and deciding what is appropriate, what is wrong and what should be 
avoided in social affairs (Brewer & Yuki, 2014).  
Therefore, specific cultural values may motivate individuals to support and 
legitimise the claims on power made by certain groups. This depends on such groups’ 
ability to appropriate and successfully represent themselves as the embodiment of 
shared cultural values (Travaglino, 2017). Alternatively, they may inform individuals 
about what types of action are appropriate or needed to pursue change, or which 
groups are illegitimate. Further research should explore the ideological function of 
cultural values, and their role in sustaining or overturning relations of dominations, 
across contexts, situations and groups. 
Social Banditry and Mafias. Another intriguing avenue of research is 
criminal organisations’ function as ‘social bandits’ (Travaglino, 2017). ICAT is 
concerned with the question of how extra-legal or illegal non-state agents are able to 
exert political power and governance over communities. These groups sometimes 
present a direct threat to the status quo. For instance, terrorist or insurgent groups may 
explicitly advocate changes in current systems. However, groups such as mafia and 
gangs also seem likely to erode the state’s authority, through their secret power to 
influence behaviour, exchange of goods, monopolise violence or provide important 
services.  
Recently, we introduced a new ‘social banditry framework’ to examine 
vicarious expression of dissent (Travaglino, 2017). Based on Hobsbawm’s (2000) 




analysis of social banditry, we argued that individuals may express their anger against 
an unjust system by supporting other agents or iconic individuals who disrupt or 
challenge that system. Vicarious dissent is more likely when those agents are 
legitimised by cultural values, and when individuals perceive direct engagement in 
political action as ineffective or difficult (Travaglino, 2017). 
 Mafia-type groups in Italy displace the state in the contexts in which they 
operate. They present themselves as champions of the poor, redistributing resources, 
and rectifying social wrongs (Schneider & Schneider, 1994; see also Vizzini’s words 
quoted above). They may therefore come to symbolise individuals’ anger about unjust 
economic and political arrangements in Italy, which tend to result in the exploitation 
of southern regions in favour of northern ones. Thus, criminal organisations may 
enable individuals to express their dissent and desire for vicarious revenge 
(Travaglino, 2017). This social banditry function of mafia-type groups (including 
gangs and other smaller criminal groups) should be further investigated across 
contexts and geographical areas.  
 Note that we are not concerned here with whether mafia-like groups are 
authentic social bandits (i.e., defenders of the wronged against an unjust system; 
Blok, 1972; Hobsbawm, 1972). They are most certainly not (Schneider & Schneider, 
2003, 2005). These groups often thrive thanks to the support of corrupt sections of the 
state (Campbell, 2012), rather than being genuinely in opposition to it. Nonetheless, 
the phenomenon of banditry itself is different from the more psychologically-oriented 
question of how these social bandits are represented and perceived in society (see 
Travaglino, 2017). More research is needed in this area, to further our understanding 
of different ways in which individuals express political dissent in society (Allen & 
Leach, 2018; Leach & Livingstone, 2015).    




Implications for the Understanding of Masculine Honour 
 Our research also has implications for the way in which cultural values of 
honour, and specifically of masculine honour, are conceptualised in social 
psychology. Research to date has mainly focused on the interpersonal implications of 
such values – such as the promotion of male anger and violence in response to insults, 
or perceived female infidelity (Rodriguez Mosquera, 2018; Rodriguez Mosquera, 
2016; Rodriguez Mosquera et al., 2008; see Uskul et al., in press for a review). In a 
similar vein, research has demonstrated that insults to the family or to important 
social categories such as the nation (Barnes et al., 2012, 2014) generate intentions to 
engage in aggressive actions against the offender. 
 In the current programme of research, in line with ICAT, we have proposed 
and provided initial empirical evidence for an additional key feature of masculine 
honour values. Specifically, we emphasise their ideological function of sustaining 
unequal relationships between groups. We contend that such values provide 
individuals with information about the appropriate and legitimate use of violence, 
while also informing them about when aggressive responses and opposition are 
acceptable ways to express dissent.  
We have argued that it is in the context of the masculine honour framework 
that the violent and predatory behaviour of criminal organisations is given legitimacy 
and criminal organisations are granted secret power. Importantly, in the specific 
setting under examination in our research programme, individuals’ endorsement of 
masculine honour values is linked not to more aggressive responses (as in previous 
research), or to more violent opposition (cf. Barnes et al., 2012, 2014), but instead is a 
predictor of inaction that results in alleged ‘passivity’ and even an acceptance of 
criminal organisations’ dominance. 




The violence of criminal organisations has limits, however. In line with the 
idea that masculine honour values set boundaries for appropriate behaviour, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that stronger use of force, or attacks on beloved individuals (for 
instance, the use of dynamite against the Sicilian judges Falcone and Borsellino), 
generated opposition from and public protest by the local population, and perhaps 
accelerated the decline of the Sicilian mafia. This suggests that exaggerated, almost 
military-level use of violence goes beyond what is deemed acceptable within the 
masculine code of honour. A priority for future research is to investigate this novel, 
and important ideological property of masculine honour in different contexts.  
Although honour values are currently important within the southern Italian 
context, we do not assume that their importance will persist or that these values are 
consensually accepted by the population. We found that different identities (e.g., 
regional and national) predict stronger or weaker endorsement of the masculine 
honour-related ideology. Moreover, even within the same social identity, a competing 
system of beliefs may arise that leads individuals to question or reject these values. 
Future research should use longitudinal and experimental methods, as well as 
investigating different subgroups within the population, to understand what can 
promote and accelerate social change in the context of organised crime. 
Generalisability of Omertà to Other Contexts and Factors 
Using ICAT, we derived a model of omertà to explain criminal organisations’ 
social influence in the Italian context. An important question to consider is the extent 
to which our findings and our model of omertà are generalisable.  Do they apply 
beyond the southern Italian context and beyond our particular groups of participants?   
The research reviewed above mainly involved samples of adolescents from a 
region of southern Italy. Adolescents are a key group because their adherence to 




values of honour and masculinity can perhaps more easily be altered compared to 
older groups (cf. Sears, 1986). Moreover, adolescents are more at risk of being 
attracted by criminal organisations because these organisations can provide them with 
a way to reject and question the institutional order (Travaglino & Drury, 2019; see 
Emler & Reicher, 1995, for a discussion). Criminal organisations also offer young 
people alluring images of easy access to status and resources to which they could 
hardly aspire otherwise.  
The generalisability of this model of omertà to different age groups is an 
important avenue for future research. This research should focus on understanding 
which features of the model summarised in Figure 4 are generalisable across age 
groups, and which factors are specific to adolescents’ or adults’ perceptions of mafia-
type organisations. For instance, whereas considerations about reputation and honour 
may be particularly important during adolescence, factors such as perceptions of state 
corruption and the economic situation of southern Italian regions may play a stronger 
role later on in life.  
Similarly, it is important to test the role of masculine honour in bestowing 
legitimacy to groups such as gangs (see Travaglino et al., 2015, for a discussion), 
terrorists and other paramilitary organisations. These groups tend to thrive in contexts 
where the weakness of the state creates space for other entities to make a claim to 
power and social influence. In these contexts, values of self-reliance and reputation 
may become more relevant and help to promote the rise of these groups.  
Finally, the model of omertà proposed here focuses specifically on the factors 
that promote the legitimisation of criminal organisations. However, the model has 
only partly explicated factors that promote social change, and more research is needed 
to expand this part of the model (Figure 4, lower part).  Relevant factors are likely to 




include different ideologies and belief structures, alternative social identities, and 
features of the context (e.g., perceived economic development and opportunities) that 
may highlight the need for change. Importantly, researchers are increasingly 
highlighting the dynamic and temporal relationships between variables involved in 
social change (cf. Abrams & Eller, 2017), and we believe it will be essential to 
consider how these factors play a role at different stages of the model. For instance, 
alternative social identities are likely to intervene at the level of the ideology of 
honour, gradually decreasing its relevance and endorsement among subgroups in the 
population. Other factors such as alternative ideologies may have a more direct 
impact on individuals’ intentions to engage in action.  
More generally, ICAT highlights the way in which non-state agents in society 
justify their actions by resorting to cultural values, traditions or shared beliefs. These 
values vary depending on the context or type of group. For instance, non-state agents 
in the Northern American context may use values associated with the protestant work 
ethic to justify processes of social exclusion and legitimise their advantages (cf. 
Furnham, 1984). Similarly, values of individualism and collectivism may also be used 
to justify a group’s claim to legitimacy (cf. Travaglino, 2017).  
As Travaglino’s (2017) study indicates, ICAT has important heuristic value 
for understanding the importance of cultural values in shaping individuals’ perception 
of, opposition to, or support for a social group. ICAT draws on disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology and political science to derive testable hypotheses about 
which clusters of values and beliefs are important for the group under examination. 
This theoretical framework therefore promotes an interdisciplinary approach.  
We also suggest that the phenomenon and concept of secret power is worthy 
of further investigation in different settings. For example, rapidly formed interest 




groups and communities may emerge through social media connections and it is not 
known how quickly they may also develop a capacity to establish secret power. Less 
localised and specific forms of secret power might arise in certain organisations, or in 
particular echelons of hierarchies (e.g., in education systems, in the military, or in 
commerce and industry). In all these contexts it seems feasible that aspects of the 
group’s wider culture can be appropriated to justify or reinforce extra-legal forms of 
control and decision making, perhaps only coming to light as publicly exposed 
instances of corruption or excess (Abrams, 2011; Abrams et al., 2018).  
Practical Implications and Conclusions 
 In the current research programme, we used Intracultural Appropriation 
Theory to derive a model of omertà with the aim of providing a novel perspective on 
how communities relate to criminal organisations. We highlighted the important role 
of masculine honour in bestowing legitimacy to these groups. In addition, we 
discussed key avenues for future research, as well as the generalisability of the model 
to different contexts and groups.  
 Italian criminal organisations and organised crime more generally are 
recognised fields of study in disciplines such as anthropology (Schneider & 
Schneider), sociology and political science (Allum, 2006; Toros & Mavelli, 2013) and 
criminology (Paoli, 2003; von Lampe, 2016). Contributions from clinically-oriented 
psychology have taken into account specific and important aspects of the impact of 
the presence of criminal organisations in the community (Giordano et al., 2017). 
However, currently there exist no specific contributions adopting a perspective 
derived from both social and political-psychology. 
 In the present contribution we have focused on what we consider to be the 
central aspect of Italian organised crime, namely its capacity to exert governance over 




the community (cf. von Lampe, 2016). We have reconceptualised criminal 
organisations as a dominant group in society and analysed the ideological basis of 
their power. Rather than grounding this power in fear, or the community’s alleged 
passivity, as argued in previous approaches, we contended that criminal 
organisations’ strategic use of violence and display of masculinity provide them with 
legitimacy and social influence. According to ICAT, groups such as criminal 
organisations both appropriate existing values and exaggerate their relevance in 
society. As well as offering a novel perspective on an important social phenomenon, 
this research has more general implications for our understanding of political 
behaviour, culture in general, and masculine honour in particular. 
 It is perhaps too early to draw prescriptions for practical implications because 
this field is still in its infancy and more research is needed to examine the 
directionality of many of the relationships described in this review. Moreover, further 
research is needed to understand the specific factors that promote social change (i.e., 
resistance to criminal organisations) and that may influence deeply ingrained cultural 
frameworks such as that of honour. Research also needs to address how secret power 
is expressed (and how it can be tackled) across groups, contexts and societies.  
 Nonetheless, we envision two different but complementary levels of 
intervention. First, interventions could seek to promote changes at the cultural level 
by providing individuals with the opportunity to question the ideology that underpins 
secret power (in the present case, masculine honour-related ideology).  For example, 
an intervention here could also address the role of the state (or lack thereof), in 
facilitating or inhibiting cultures of honour. If the hypothesis that criminal 
organisations’ power derives from their use of the masculine honour-related ideology 
is supported empirically, then reductions in the diffusion of this ideology should 




translate into lower legitimisation and perhaps stronger intentions to actively oppose 
criminal organisations.  
 Second, interventions could question criminal organisations’ representation of 
their embodiment of the relevant cultural value, in this case, as ‘men of honour’. 
Italian criminal organisations appropriate these values and tend to portray themselves 
as the embodiment of honour and respect. However, in reality their actions seldom 
live up to the expectations set up by this ideology. Attempts to sever the link between 
criminal organisations and the ideology of honour have been made by journalists like 
Saviano, or judges like Falcone and Borsellino, among others, whose actions or books 
have demonstrated that there is little that is honourable in the actions of criminal 
organisations. The violent response of criminal organisations (the judges Falcone and 
Borsellino were murdered and Saviano has been living under police protection for 
more than 10 years) demonstrate that they take the actions of such people very 
seriously, presumably because of their potential to undermine one of the key bases of 
criminal organisations’ legitimacy. 
 None of what has been offered here is intended to undermine the importance 
of interventions to tackle secret power at different levels. Indeed, in many instances, 
the potential for social change might well be facilitated by a redistribution of 
resources to disadvantaged or disenfranchised populations and groups. In the case of 
Italy, the economic imbalance in favour of the north is as relevant now as it was more 
than 40 years ago (see for instance Eckaus, 1961, and Lagravinese, 2015). While 
structural interventions at the macro-social and political levels are likely to be 
necessary, we advocate an interdisciplinary effort that integrates knowledge from 
different approaches and levels of analysis. Because individuals will act according to 
a socially mediated understanding of their personal and collective circumstances, a 




complete account will require a social-psychological perspective such as the one we 
have offered here.  
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1     ‘Mafiosi’ is the Italian term to indicate ‘members of the mafia’. It is the plural of 
the term ‘mafioso’. 
2     The Yakuza refers to a transnational criminal organisation that originates and 
sustain power in Japan (Hill, 2003). 
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Figure 1: Intracultural Appropriation Theory of Non-state Agent’s Secret Power 
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Figure 3: Simplified Structural Equation Model testing the associations between Regional Identification, Masculine Honour, Social Change 



























Notes: *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Dashed lines are the indirect effect of Regional Identity on Collective Action Intentions via Social 
Change Beliefs. Dotted Lines are the indirect effect of Regional Identity on Collective Action Intentions via Masculine Honour Values. Attitudes 
towards Criminal Organisations was an additional mediator in the model. Honour Values Scale, Honour Ideology for Womanhood Scale, Social 
Dominance Orientation, System Justification Scale, Gender, and Age are covariates in the model.   
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Figure 4: Simplified Longitudinal Panel Model testing the relationship between Masculine Honour-related Ideology and Contact with Criminal 





























Notes: *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Dashed lines are non-significant path. Gender and Age are covariates in the model. Latent 
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Note: The lower part of the model refers to factors that promote social change. Dashed arrows refer therefore to negative paths, whereas non-
dashed arrows refer to positive paths. The model is incomplete and additional variables are to be investigated in future research as represented 
by the suspension points in the boxes.  
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Social Change Belief Structures 
Alternative cultural beliefs  
Alternative social identities  
Alternative ideologies and identity content 
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Table 1: Summary of the Basic Model of Omertà across Studies 
 
 
Study Masculine Honour  
Attitudes towards Criminal 
Organisations 
Attitudes towards Criminal 
Organisations  Collective 
Intentions to Oppose 
Criminal Organisations 
Indirect Effects 
Travaglino, Abrams, and Randsley de 
Moura  (2014; Study 1)* 
 
β = .23, SE = .09, p = .01   β = −.21, SE = .09, p = .02 β = −.05, SE = .03, 95% CI = −.13 to −.01 
Travaglino, Abrams, and Randsley de 
Moura  (2014; Study 2)** 
 
β = .49, SE = .06, p < .001 β = −.27, SE = .05, p < .001 β = −.167, SE = .04, 95% CI = −.25 to −.095 
Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura 
and Russo (2014)† 
 
b = .25, SE = .09,  p < .01 b = −.26, SE = .10, p = .01 b = −.06, SE = .04, 95% CI = −.16, −.01 
Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura 
and Russo (2015)‡ 
 
β = .32, SE = 0.09, p<.001 β = -.18, SE = .09, p = .02 β =_.06, SE = 0.04, 95% CI =_0.15 to _0.001 
Travaglino, Abrams & Russo (2017) # 
 
β = .31, SE = 0.04, p < .001 β = −.10, SE = 0.05, p = .03 β = −.03, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.062, −0.002] 
 Notes: Covariates in the model and additional mediators of the relationship between masculine honour and collective intentions were: *System Justification 
Scale; ** Collective Motives and Anxiety about Police; † System Justification Scale, Perceived Risk of Interacting with Criminal Organisations, Vicarious 
Guilt and Shame; ‡ Social Dominance Orientation, System Justification Scale, Perceived Risk of Interacting with criminal organisations, Collective Motives; # 
Social Dominance Orientation, System Justification Scale, Honour Ideology for Womanhood, Honour Values Scale, Age, Gender, Social Change Beliefs 
